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I. INTRODUCTION

Joint criminal enterprise (JCE)-a judicially interpreted doctrine'has become a "hallmark" mode of liability at the international Tribunals.
This concept has been referred to as the "magic bullet of the OTP"2 and the
"nuclear bomb of the international prosecutor's arsenal." It is obvious as
to why: with these three words, the Prosecution has charged collective and
institutional guilt, in one fell swoop. At the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR), the Prosecution encapsulates its theory of a conspiracy

*
Beth S. Lyons was Trial Co-Counsel for Aloys Simba in 2004-2005, on the Defence team
headed by Lead Counsel Me. Sadikou Ayo Alao. She is grateful to Me. Alao for discussions on the
points in this paper. She is a member of the Bureau for the International Association of Democratic
Lawyers (IADL) and an Alternate Representative for IADL to the U.N. in New York. Simba Decisions
and Judgments may be found at the ICTR website, www.ictr.org. The author thanks Nathaniel G. Dutt
for his assistance.

JCE has been held to be part of "committing" under Articles 6(1) and 7 of the Statute of
I.
the International Tribunal for Rwanda; see generally Prosecutor v. Milutinovic et al., Case No. IT-9937-AR72, Decision on Ojdanic Challenge to JCE Jurisdiction (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia May 21, 2003), Separate Opinion by Judge David Hunt.
2.
William A. Schabas, Mens Rea and the International Criminal Tribunalfor the Former
Yugoslavia, 37 NEw ENG. L. REv. 1015, 1032 (2003).
3.
Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal
Enterprise, Command Responsibility and the Development of InternationalCriminalLaw, 93 CAL. L.
REV. 75, 137 (2005).
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of government (both at the national and local level)-military Hutu

intelligentsia, whom it alleges planned and committed the crimes of 1994all within the allegation of JCE.
Perhaps more than any other judicial doctrine, these three words "joint
criminal enterprise" have routinely violated the fair trial rights of
defendants at the Tribunals and diluted the requirements for the special
intent needed for genocide. Many legal scholars have identified and
criticized the legal problems of this "guilt by association" template,
especially in respect to the third category of JCE and the mens rea,4 the
conflation and confusion between conspiracy and JCE by the Prosecution,5
and the distinction, if any, between JCE and acting in concert,6 to name
just a few issues. These problems inherent in the JCE doctrine are
exacerbated by the additional failures of the Prosecution and Tribunals to
follow the jurisprudence, which mandates strict construction in the pleading
and proof of JCE.7
4.
There is a plethora of literature on this point, especially in the last five years. See, e.g.,
Goran Sluiter, Symposium: Guilty by Association: Joint Criminal Enterpriseon Trial, 5 J. INT'L CRIM.
JUST. 67, 67-68 (2007); see also Danner & Martinez, supra note 3, at 124; Schabas, supra note 2, at
1017; David L. Nersessian, hoops, I Committed Genocide! The Anomaly of ConstructiveLiabilityfor
Serious InternationalCrimes, 30 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 81, 82 (2006); Mark Osiel, The Banalityof
Good: Aligning Incentives Against Mass Atrocity, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 1751, 1802 (2005) (discussing
elasticity and vagueness problems, and quoting from an interview with an ICTY Prosecutor that "it is
really rather haphazard who gets tossed into the pot" of a given enterprise).
5.
Despite the Prosecution's erroneous and continuous practice of treating conspiracy and
JCE as legally fungible, appellate jurisprudence draws a distinction between a substantive crime and a
mode of liability. See Prosecutor v. Kvocka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Appeal Judgment, 191 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2005) ("Joint criminal enterprise is simply a means of
committing a crime; it is not a crime in itself.").
6.
See Separate and Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Per-Johan Lindholm in Prosecutor v.
Simic et al., Case No. IT-95-9-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 2 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 17, 2003).
I dissociate myself from the concept or doctrine ofjoint criminal enterprise in this
case as well as generally. The so-called basic form of joint criminal enterprise
does not, in my opinion, have any substance on its own. It is nothing more than a
new label affixed to a since long well-known concept or doctrine in most
jurisdictions as well as international criminal law, namely co-perpetration.
Id.
7.
See Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36, Appeal Decision, 1 428 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2007) (The Appeals Chamber emphasized that "JCE is not an openended concept that permits convictions based on guilt by association. On the contrary, a conviction
based on the doctrine of JCE can occur only where the Chamber finds all necessary elements satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt"); Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Trial Judgment,
219 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2001) (The Trial Chamber warned that
"[sitretching notions of individual mens rea too thin may lead to the imposition of criminal liability on
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It is evident to anyone who has had to defend a client against the
charge of JCE that the notion is legally convoluted, and its use or
application is illogical and violates the rights of defendants. Its ubiquitous
presence in the ICTR and International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) cases illustrates the urgency of the Tribunals to assign
collective guilt-even if that is based on unpleaded and unproven
allegations involving a named defendant and an unnamed, amorphous
infinite universe of JCE members. Moreover, these are allegations against
which a defendant can neither legally nor logically completely defend
himself.8 Thus, in the quest for collective guilt, blame, and punishment, the
legally defective doctrine of JCE has been permitted, wrongly in my view,
to assume "center stage" in the indictments and convictions at the
Tribunals. Although there are clearly multiple contenders for the "lowest
point" of Tribunal jurisprudence, JCE continues to claim its place at the top
of the charts.
II. THE SIMBA CASE
The Simba case was one of the first single defendant cases at the ICTR
in which the Prosecution alleged JCE.9 Aloys Simba was charged with
genocide, or alternatively, complicity in genocide, murder, and
extermination as crimes against humanity.'o The basic defence in Simba
was alibi, which was accepted by the Trial Chamber for part of the period
of time in question, but rejected for the period during which his

individuals for what is actually guilt by association, a result that is at odds with the driving principles
behind the creation of this international Tribunal.").
As Ohlin points out, "there is no warrant for extending liability to a JCE simply because
8.
the very nature of these crimes is collective. The question is not whether it is collective or not but what
kind of collective action is criminal under the ICTY Statute." Jens David Ohlin, Three Conceptual
Problems with the Doctrine ofJoint CriminalEnterprise,5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 70, 74 (2007).
I think there was one single defendant case, prior to Simba, where "common scheme" was
9.
charged. However, appellate jurisprudence requires strict adherence to the requirements of JCE notice,
regardless of the exact words charged. Prosecutor v. Giacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR-01-64-A, Appeal
Judgment, 1 158-179, 289 (July 7, 2006) (The Appeals Chamber dismissed the Prosecution's appeal of
error in the Trial Chamber judgment that it could not make a finding on JCE because it was not pleaded
clearly enough to permit the Accused to defend himself, holding that although the absence of the words
"joint criminal enterprise" is not in itself defective, the question is whether the Accused has been
meaningfully informed of the nature of the charge.).
See Prosecutor v. Simba, Case No. ICTR-01-76-1, Amended Indictment Pursuant to 6
10.
May 2004 Decision, III (May 10, 2004) [hereinafter Simba Amended Indictment]. The Prosecution
withdrew the counts of complicity and murder as a crime against humanity in its Closing Brief.
Prosecutor v. Simba, Case No. ICTR-01-76-T, Trial Judgment, 113 (Dec. 13, 2005) [hereinafter Simba
Trial Judgment].
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participation was alleged in massacres and killings." On December 13,
2005, the Trial Chamber convicted Aloys Simba, a retired Lieutenant
Colonel in the Rwandan Army and a former member of the Rwandan
Parliament for the National Republican Movement for Democracy and
Development (MRND), which party he left in September 1993, of genocide
and extermination as a crime against humanity for participation in a JCE to
kill Tutsi civilians at two sites: Murambi Technical School and Kaduha
Parish, both in the Gikongoro prefecture.12 Simba was sentenced to twentyfive years.13 On appeal, the judgment was affirmed.14 In 2009, he was
transferred from Arusha to Benin, where he is now serving his sentence. 5
Unfortunately, the Tribunal made bad law in respect to JCE (as well as
other issues) in the Simba case. This brief paper addresses only two of the
erroneous holdings in the Trial Chamber's judgment: (a) the Trial
Chamber's conclusion that the manner in which the Prosecution gave notice
of its theory of JCE did "not in any way render the trial unfair,"16 and (b)
the Trial Chamber's conclusion that Simba possessed "momentary"
genocidal intent, at the site, which he shared with the countless unnamed
others at the site." Both of these points-the pleading of JCE, particularly
in respect to the material element of identity of membership; and the "on
the spot" mens rea finding-illustrate the dangers and illegalities of the JCE
doctrine. The points on proof in reference to JCE are not addressed here.' 8

11.

Simba Trial Judgment, supra note 10, 1384.

12. As the Trial Chamber stated in its Summary of the Judgment, this trial was the first case in
the Tribunal concerning the events in the Gikongoro prefecture (Simba's prefecture). Hence, Simba was
the first person from this area to be convicted. It was the Defence's view that this was significant, and
the lack of prior convictions from this area was an added impetus to find Simba guilty.
13.

See generally Simba Trial Judgment, supra note 10.

14.
See generally Simba v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-01-76-A, Appeal Chamber Judgment
(Nov. 27, 2007) [hereinafter Simba Appeal Judgment].
15.
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, ICTR Detainees-Status on 17 January 2011,
available at http://www.unictr.org/Cases/StatusofDetainees/tabid/202/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 24,
2011).
16.

Simba Trial Judgment, supra note 10, 1396.

17.

Id.1418.

18.
The Defence argued that the Prosecution did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a
joint criminal enterprise existed, and did not prove that a criminal nexus existed between Aloys Simba
and the persons named in paragraph 14. Moreover, the Prosecution could not prove that a criminal
nexus existed between Simba "and others" (who were unnamed) alleged to be in the joint criminal
enterprise. Lastly, the Defence raised reasonable doubt that Aloys Simba had any criminal connection
or relationship to the named persons in paragraph 14 for the purpose of carrying out the objective of a
joint criminal enterprise.
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III. THE "LOOSE" APPLICATION OF JCE PLEADING RULES, ESPECIALLY AS
TO THE IDENTITY OF JCE MEMBERS-FAIR TRIAL ERRORS INTHE TRIAL
CHAMBER AND APPEAL JUDGMENTS
Specificity in pleading is a general principle of notice. The rules of
JCE pleading are simple and direct. JCE must be pleaded in an
"unambiguous manner" and the form of JCE on which the Prosecution is
relying must be specified.' 9 In pleading the form of JCE, the Prosecution
must also plead the mens rea, which is specific to each of the three forms. 20
In addition, the Prosecution must plead the following material elements of
JCE: its purpose, the identity of the co-participants, and the nature of the
accused's participation in the enterprise. 2 1 The Prosecution is expected to
know its case, and not mold its theory as the evidence evolves. 22
Despite the abundance of appellate jurisprudence on the requirement
of notice, and the due process requirements found in international law and
conventions, it often appears that the Prosecution and the Trial Chamber
take the position that JCE is somehow exempt from, or not an urgent matter
23
of, notice.
These legal requirements are regularly violated by the
Prosecution, as illustrated by the multiple pleadings on defects in the
indictment, found in Simba and other cases.

19.
Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Case No. ICTR-99-46-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 34 (Feb. 25,
2004) (affirmed on appeal, July 7, 2006). See Prosecutor v. Brdnanin & Talic, Case No. IT-99-36,
Decision on Form of Further Amended Indictment and Prosecution Application to Amend, 81(4a),
(4b) (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 26, 2001) (The Trial Chamber ordered that the
Prosecution plead (a) whether the crimes alleged fell within or outside the object of the joint criminal
enterprise; and (b) that the Accused had the mens rea required for those crimes within the object of the
enterprise.). See also Prosecutor v. Kmojelac, Case No. IT-97-25, Decision on Form of the Second
Amended Indictment, 1 16 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 11, 2000).
20.
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1 -A, Appeal Judgment,
for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).

IM220-28

(Int'l Crim. Trib.

21.
See Prosecutor v. Kvocka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Appeal Judgment, TV 28, 42 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2005).
19
22.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR-2000-55A-A, Appeal Judgment,
(Aug. 29, 2008); see also Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Case No. ICTR-99-46, Appeal Judgment, 27 (July
7, 2006) and Trial Judgment, 24 (Feb. 25, 2004); Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-A,
Appeal Judgment, 92 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 23, 2001). Note that there is
abundant jurisprudence, at both Tribunals, on this point.
Unfortunately, other Trial Chambers have not promptly decided Defence objections on the
23.
pleading of JCE. For example, in the "Military II" case, the Trial Chamber, in a 2006 decision on a
Defence motion, deferred ruling on the JCE objections. Prosecutor v. Ndindiliyimana, Case No. ICTR00-56-T, Decision on Nzuwonemeye's Motion to Exclude Parts of Witness AOG's Testimony, 1 27
(Mar. 30, 2006). At the time of closing arguments in June 2009, the Trial Chamber still had not made a
ruling on JCE.
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But what is significant in Simba is that even where the Trial Chamber
initially ruled that the Prosecution's pleadings were lacking in respect to
JCE, the Trial Chamber did not take a position that a remedy was mandated
as a matter of fair trial. Instead, its position was to justify the Prosecution's
defective pleading, particularly in respect to the material element of identity
of members in the JCE and the forms of JCE, and each's respective mens
rea, and to provide "legal" rationales to cover the violations.
IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

It should be noted that the JCE defects in the indictment were in the
context of a generally defective indictment, which was vague, lacked
specificity to support elements of the crimes and forms of liability charged,
lacked time frames, etc. The Defence's position was that the JCE allegation
was a legal fiction: the allegation was neither pleaded in conformity with
the legal requirementS24 nor, as we argued at closing arguments, proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.
The three words, "joint criminal enterprise," first appeared in the first
amended indictment, filed in January 2004. In response to Defence
objections to the inadequate pleading of JCE, the Trial Chamber
acknowledged that the state of mind of the Accused or his alleged partners
in the JCE was not specifically pleaded, and "consider[ed] that the amended
indictment should be amended to plead the mens rea element of joint
criminal enterprise." 25 However, the Trial Chamber's Order to the
Prosecution to provide details was tempered with "if it is in a position to do
so." This essentially left the Prosecution an option to decide what it could
or would do, if anything. The Prosecution, however, was never "in a
position" to comply with the legal pleading requirements for JCE.
In the second amended indictment, filed May 10 to conform with the
May 6 decision, the Prosecution simply tacked on the phrase "in concert
with others as part of a joint criminal enterprise" to the statutory definition
of Article 6(1).26 The Prosecution did not plead mens rea for each form,
nor specify any form of JCE, but simply added paragraph 58 which stated
that Simba "intended to commit the acts above, this intent being shared by
all other individuals involved in the crimes perpetrated."
24.
See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeal Judgment, IM 220-28 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999), and its progeny.
25.
Prosecutor v. Simba, Case No. ICTR-01-76-I, Decision on Preliminary Defence Motion
Regarding Defects in the Form of the Indictment, IN 11-12 (May 6, 2004).
26.
See Simba Amended Indictment, supra note 10. Numerous cases have rejected this
practice and have held that tracking of elements in an indictment does not provide notice. See also
Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR-2000-55A-A, Appeal Judgment, 1144 (Aug. 29, 2008).
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The Prosecution amendment (paragraph 58) was essentially a "onesize fits all" mens rea for the three forms of JCE, and a good example of
what the Kronjelac Appeals Chamber refers to as "persistent ambiguity" in
the pleading of JCE.27 The Defence filed another motion on defects in this
second amended indictment, which was denied by the Trial Chamber. It
held that the indictment, as a whole, provided adequate notice. The Trial
Chamber, however, acknowledged that the indictment referred to JCE
without specifying the particular form, but understood this to mean that the
Prosecution was relying on all three forms. The Trial Chamber cautioned
that each paragraph should not be read in isolation and should be
considered in the context of the other paragraphs of the indictment. Thus,
with ICTR "jurisprudence parlance," the Trial Chamber proceeded to
"remedy-away" the defect in pleading.28
In its closing brief, the
Prosecution-for the first time-gave notice that it was basically pursuing
only JCE 1.29
In its Judgment, the Trial Chamber stated that the Prosecution
provided additional detail on JCE in its Pre-Trial Brief.30 This was its first
reference in any decision to the Prosecution Pre-Trial Brief (PTB), filed
May 10, 2004, as a form of notice. But, again, the Trial Judgment was less
than equivocal in its findings. The Trial Chamber also stated that it "does
not exclude that the Prosecution could have pleaded the requisite elements
of joint criminal enterprise in a more clear and organized manner in the
Indictment.""
However, the PTB sections on the joint criminal enterprise generally
suffered from the same problems of vagueness and lack of specificity as the

27.
Prosecutor v. Kmojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Appeal Judgment,
for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 17, 2003).

1

144 (Int'l Crim. Trib.

28.
Prosecutor v. Simba, Case No. ICTR-01-76-T, Decision on the Defence's Preliminary
Motion Challenging the Second Amended Indictment, 1 6 (July 14, 2004), which reads:
The Chamber notes that the indictment only refers to joint criminal enterprise
without specifying the particular form. In the Chamber's view, the indictment's
failure to point to a particular form of joint criminal enterprise reflects the
Prosecution's intention to rely on all three forms. Consequently, the indictment
must plead the distinct mens rea for each form of joint criminal enterprise. In
assessing an indictment, the Chamber is mindful that each paragraph should not
be read in isolation but rather should be considered in the context of the other
paragraphs in the indictment. (footnotes omitted).
29.

Simba Trial Judgment, supra note 10,

30.

Id. T 391.

31.

Id.

386.
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facially defective amended indictments.32 There was no notice in respect to
the different mens rea for each form of JCE and the alleged JCE
membership included broad, general categories and simply repeated
paragraph 14 of the Amended Indictment. There was no nexus alleged
between specific allegations of the Indictment and Simba's alleged
participation in a joint criminal enterprise. Thus, the Defence argued that
reliance on the PTB to remedy material defects in an indictment was in
error and, in the alternative, even if the PTB were accepted, it did not cure
any defective notice.33
In its judgment, the Trial Chamber took the position, following its
earlier decision, that in the absence of any form being pleaded, all three
forms were being alleged. As to the problem that the mens rea specified in
paragraph 58 of the Indictment applied to only one form, the Judgment
"resolved" this defect by holding that the Prosecution had, at the close of its
case, stated it was principally pursuing form one only and the Trial
Chamber, no doubt, was satisfied that form one mens rea was pleaded.34
This "logical" perspective on the [non]pleading of form is a
disingenuous representation. In fact, what had occurred was that the
Prosecution had molded its case, based on the evidence at trial-a practice
legally opposed by a long line of trial and appellate jurisprudence holding
that the Prosecution is expected to "know its case" before proceeding to
trial.35 The Trial Chamber never held the Prosecution accountable for its
failure to plead (or prove) what it had claimed as its theory of JCE
liability-all three forms of JCE liability. The Trial Chamber basically
"covered up" the Prosecution's failure to give notice on the form and mens
rea in any way which was meaningful to the Defendant.
Based on this, the elementary fair trial principle of notice, i.e., that the
defendant has a right to be informed in detail of the charges against him

32. See generally Prosecutor v. Simba, Case No. ICTR-O1-76-T, Prosecutor's Pre-Trial Brief
(May 10, 2004) (on file with author).
Use of the PTB to cure defects in the indictment has been held to be a "less preferred
33.
practice." See Prosecutor v. Kronjelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Appeal Judgment, I 138 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 17, 2003) ("This option, however, is limited by the need to guarantee
the accused a fair trial.").
34.
Simba Trial Judgment, supra note 10, 386. But see Prosecutor v. Bikindi, Case No.
ICTR-01-72-T, Trial Judgment, 1 400 (Dec. 2, 2008), where the Trial Chamber held that "by pleading
all three categories of joint criminal enterprise, the Prosecution failed to properly inform Bikindi as to
which form of joint criminal enterprise was being alleged." In Bikindi, as in Simba, the Prosecution
stated that it intended to rely on all three categories of JCE.
35.
29, 2008).

See Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR-2000-55A-A, Appeal Judgment,

1

18 (Aug.
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before (and not after) he presents his case, was violated by the Prosecution
and-at times-with the complicity of the Trial Chamber.
V. "NEVER Too LATE"-THE PROSECUTION'S CHANGE INTHE MATERIAL
ELEMENT OF IDENTITY IN THE ALLEGED JCE SEVEN MONTHS AFTER IT
HAD CLOSED ITS CASE

The issue of the timing of "notice" was particularly egregious in
respect to the identity of the participants of the alleged JCE. Paragraph 14
of the Indictment stated that "[i]n preparing and planning the massacres,
which occurred in the Gikongoro and Butare prefectures in April and May
1994, Aloys Simba acted in concert with" eight named persons and others
not known to the Prosecution.3 6 The Defence prepared its case37 based on
the allegations that the eight named individuals in paragraph 14, according
to the Prosecution, comprised the members of the alleged joint criminal
enterprise. The Defence questioned witnesses about Simba's relationship,
if any, to these named persons. The Trial Chamber, as well, questioned
witnesses similarly on the names in paragraph 14. Thus, the Defence-as
well as the Prosecution and the Trial Chamber-relied on paragraph 14 of
the Simba Indictment as the factual support for the material element of
identity of the named persons in the alleged joint criminal enterprise.
In its Closing Brief, filed on June 22, 2005, the Prosecution changed
the identity of the alleged joint criminal enterprise members, by close to
fifty percent. The Prosecution identified a new total of fifteen individuals,
almost twice as many as in paragraph 14. Seven new persons who did not
appear on the paragraph 14 list had been added, and one of the original
names had been removed. 8
The Defence, obviously taken by surprise, had been-more
accurately-ambushed. 39 But the Judgment is silent on this fair trial
violation. No where can one find a reference in the Judgment to the
Prosecution's nearly fifty percent change of the alleged JCE membership in
its Closing Brief.

36.
Paragraph 14 included eight named individuals, and others: Faustin Sebuhura, Laurent
Bucyibaruta, Damien Biniga, Denys Kamodoka, Juvenal Ndabarinze, Lieutenant Colonel Augustin
Rwamanya, Joachim Hategekimana, Charles Munyaneza, and others not known to the Prosecution.
Simba Amended Indictment, supra note 10, 1 14.
37.
Throughout, the Defence maintained that JCE was not pleaded, and did not waive its
objections to the defective pleading ofjoint criminal enterprise. See generally id.
38.

Simba Appeal Judgment, supra note 14,

69.

39.
The Defence was informed of this change in the JCE composition after it had rested, when
it was impossible to defend against the allegations of the new named members, and preserved objections
to this fair trial violation in its subsequent closing arguments.
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In fact, the Trial Chamber found that the Indictment "adequately
identifies the participants alleged to have materially committed the crimes
forming part of the common criminal purpose."40 The Trial Chamber held
that "some are named in various paragraphs throughout the Indictment in
connection with planning of the attack."4'
On appeal, the Defence argued that the identity of participants in the
joint criminal enterprise is a material element and should be pleaded in the
Indictment. The change in close to fifty percent of the composition of the
joint criminal enterprise after the close of evidence can hardly be deemed a
"minor discrepancy."'4 2 Further, such a material change causes prejudice to
the Defence and misleads the Defence.43 The Defence also argued that the
Prosecution opted to "surprise" the Defence with its changes in the Closing
Brief, after the trial, rather than choose the option of Rule 50," which
provides procedures for amendment of an indictment. The Prosecution did
not make any motion, pursuant to Rule 50, to amend the Indictment in
respect to the names.
In addition, the Defence pointed out that the Trial Chamber's finding
that "some [of the JCE members] are named in various paragraphs
throughout the Indictment,"45 was inconsistent with its own holdings in the
Judgment.4
As to the vagueness of the category of participants, the Trial Chamber
held that "named individuals, as well as the attackers, should be considered
The Trial Chamber
as participants in the joint criminal enterprise.
continued that it is "not satisfied that the Prosecution could have provided
more specific identification," and held that identification by category, such
as Gendarmes and Interahamwe, is sufficient.4 8
40.

Simba Trial Judgment, supra note 10,

41.

Id.

1392.

42. Cf Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23/1-A, Appeal Judgment, 217 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002) ("Minor discrepancies" between the dates in the trial
judgment and those in the indictment in respect to rapes were not found to be unreasonable.).
43.

See Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-A, Appeal Judgment,

303 (May 26,

2003).
44. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rules of Procedure & Evidence, Rule 50,
U.N. Doc. ITR/3/REV.1 (June 29, 1995).
45.

Simba Trial Judgment, supra note 10,

392 n.402.

46. Nsengiyumva and Karamage are named in paragraph 15, but this paragraph was found to
be defective, and the evidence of Simba's second visit to Gasarenda Centre (to Karamage's bar) is not a
basis of conviction. Ngogo, Gakuru, Nkusi, and Bakundukize are named in paragraph 57, but the Trial
Chamber found no evidence to support the allegations. Simba Trial Judgment, supra note 10, 'W 23, 86.
47.

Id. 393.

48.

Id.
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In sum, the Trial Chamber's position was so broad as to eviscerate the
meaning of notice for material elements of joint criminal enterprise as held
by the Appeals Chamber in Kronjelac and other cases, and to nullify the
legal elements such as findings of shared mens rea, required by Tadic.49
The Appeals Chamber dismissed all the Appellant's arguments on JCE
and notice. It affirmed that: (a) the Indictment provided adequate notice of
the JCE5 0 and adequate notice of the identity of the participants in the
JCE,"' and (b) the pleading of the category of JCE was not inadequate.5 2
The Appeals Chamber found that the Defence arguments about lack of
notice in the Closing Brief were "misconceived."
It stated that the
"Prosecution final trial briefs are only filed at the end of a trial, after the
presentation of all the evidence, and therefore are not relevant for the
preparation of an accused's case."5
Where the Prosecution gives legally compliant and timely notice to the
Defence, one cannot disagree with this statement on final trial briefs.
However, the Appeals Chamber totally disregarded the history of the
Prosecution's violations of notice in this case, especially on JCE and the
Defence's pleadings that it was taken by surprise with the Prosecution's
"post-trial notice." At such a point, the Defence could do nothing, for
example, to defend against the new JCE allegations which were raised by
the Prosecution on the "eve" of closing arguments.
VI. THE "ON THE SPOT" INTENT

The legal and factual impossibility of defending against the unknown
is a truism. How can an accused defend against allegations of "shared
genocidal intent," as well as an intent to be part of a JCE, with an infinite
universe of alleged nameless JCE members? The JCE doctrine, inherently
defective, and especially in the hands of a less than legally rigorous and

49.
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No IT-94-1-A, Appeal Judgment,
Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).
50.

Simba Appeal Judgment, supra note 14,

220 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the

68.

51.
Id. 75 (adopting the reasoning of the Trial Chamber judgment, paragraphs 392 and 393,
which refer to paragraph 14 as the listing for the JCE members, and holds that others are named
throughout the indictment and that the Prosecution could not have provided more details about the
general categories of participants, Interahamwe or Gendarmes).
52.
Id. IT 76-80. The Appeals Chamber, like the Trial Chamber, made the same observation
of the Prosecution's failure to specifically name the category of JCE on which it intended to rely in the
indictment. However, it agreed that paragraph 58 gave sufficient notice of the mens rea requirement for
JCE I, when read together with the rest of the indictment.
53.
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scrupulous prosecution, raises this absurd and illogical scenario to a legal
travesty.
The Trial Chamber, in respect to the two massacre sites (Kaduha and
Murambi) found that "the only reasonable conclusion, even accepting his
[Aloys Simba] submissions as true, is that at that moment, he acted with
genocidal intent."5 4 The legal issue on appeal was whether the finding that
"on the spot" or "momentary" genocidal intent is supported in law. The
Defence argued that for the crime of genocide to occur, the mens rea must
be formed prior to the commission of the genocidal acts.55 The Defence
also argued that the mens rea requirement for the JCE and the mens rea as
an element of the crime are two distinct legal concepts. Hence, JCE
requires two separate intents-the intent to be part of the JCE, and the
intent of the object of the JCE, in this case, the special intent for genocide.56
But both the trial and appellate judgments collapse these two intents into
one intent-which could, at the moment, be formed.
The Appeals Chamber found no merit in this position, stating that the
"inquiry is not whether the specific intent was formed prior to the
commission of the acts, but whether at the moment of commission the
perpetrators possessed the necessary intent. The Trial Chamber correctly
considered whether Appellant and the physical perpetrators possessed
genocidal intent at the time of the massacres."5 7
These holdings could be read to contradict the Prosecution thesis that
there was a conspiracy to plan genocide, a point which has been rejected by
the appellate jurisprudence in the "Media" case58 and others, and recently in
the "Military I" and "Military II" cases acquitting the defendants of
conspiracy to commit genocide. 9 If the intent is formed spontaneously or
"at the moment" as Simba holds, then planning genocide or conspiring to
commit genocide, both of which suggest a prior formation of intent, are
54.

Simba Trial Judgment, supra note 10,

418.

55.
Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment,
91 (May 21, 1999) (holding undisturbed on appeal). Admittedly, the jurisprudence on this point is
minimal.
See Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Appeal Judgment, 365 (Int'l Crim.
56.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2007) (Where convictions under the first category of JCE are
concerned, the accused must both intend the commission of the crime and intend to participate in a
common plan aimed at its commission.).
57.
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See generally Nahimana et al. v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Appeal Judgment
58.
(Nov. 28, 2007).
See generally Prosecutor v. Bagosora et al. ("Military I"), Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Trial
59.
Judgment (Dec. 18, 2008). See also Prosecutor v. Ndindiliyimana ("Military II"), Case No. ICTR-0056-T, Summary of Trial Judgment (May 17, 2011).
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repugnant legal notions. This may be an unintended consequence of the
bad law. Not exactly a "silver lining" though, when one considers the legal
injustices committed in the name of "JCE."
VII. CONCLUSION
When litigation of JCE in the Simba case commenced, the number of
articles on JCE was limited. Perusing the literature today, there is definitely
a larger and vocal critique of JCE, in addition to the body of Defence
litigation at both Tribunals. This is a positive step, but unfortunately offers
no redress to those wrongly convicted under the theory of JCE. Cases can
not be "re-opened" based on the increasing acknowledgement of the defects
inherent in JCE and these convictions cannot be written off as "collateral
damage" in the quest to assign collective blame and responsibility. The
defective doctrine of JCE has been a lynchpin in the injustices of the
Tribunals, and illustrates how legal doctrine, often nurtured by the
Chambers, services the political agenda of the Prosecution. The result is a
political and legal legacy of tortured law and tortured "justice."

